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Back in 1995, Russian economist Alexey Ulyukaev, who became Minister of Economic 
Development in 2013 (and who was arrested for allegations of corruption in 2016), 
stated: 
 
“The main question of every evolution is constraining political power: how to 
provide competent decision-making, which will depend upon knowledge and 
experience but not upon voting results, and how to achieve a “regime of non-
interference” of politics in other spheres of public life.” 
 
This statement is an example of the technocratic approach to policymaking, aiming to 
insulate policy adoption and implementation from the influence of politics. Such an 
approach has been popular among Russia’s economic liberals since the early 1990s, but 
it has often led to contradictory effects in terms of both politics and policy outcomes. 
Why do promises of technocratic policy reforms, advocated by liberal-minded experts in 
Russia and other post-Soviet countries, often remain unfulfilled? The issue is related to 
the notion of “technocratic traps,” which is when policy reformers are isolated from 
public opinion, become too dependent on the personal priorities of political leaders, and 
face strong resistance from entrenched bureaucrats and powerful rent-seeking interest 
groups. When this happens, technocratic policy reforms are often curtailed. Russia’s 
reformers have found (and still find) themselves wedged between forces that expect 
policy successes and those that put up sky-high resistance.  
 
The Origins and Substance of Post-Soviet Technocracy 
 
In May 1992, the Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and Russian First Deputy Prime 
Minister Yegor Gaidar met in a beerhouse in Prague. Their discussions about economic 
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policy soon evolved into a heated debate on the politics of transition. Klaus suggested 
that Gaidar and his team should not limit themselves to policy recommendations but 
become independent political actors who had to build political bases of support, 
compete for political power, establish political parties, and participate in elections. 
Otherwise, Klaus warned, policy reforms in Russia could be reversed. Russia’s economic 
liberals, however, followed Klaus’ recommendations partially and inconsistently. Their 
parties in the 1990s claimed to serve as junior partners in the informal ruling coalition 
and rarely demonstrated political autonomy from the Kremlin. Similar tendencies were 
observed in the 2000s, when technocratic reformers were at the forefront of 
policymaking in Russia but accepted Kremlin-imposed formal and informal “rules of the 
game” as given facts. In the 2010s, technocratic reformers in Russia continued to serve in 
these roles, despite the dramatic shrinking of their room for maneuver in terms of 
making policy. Yet many analyses of policy reforms in Russia (and elsewhere) still 
disregard the impact of politics as a key factor in the success and failure of policy 
changes. 
 
The technocratic model of policy reforms in post-Soviet countries has faced numerous 
problems related to the notorious inefficiency of the state apparatus and the policy 
influence of interest groups. The technocratic model presupposes that politics should be 
banished from the policy arena. Yet politics affects policymaking due to the rise of 
oligarchs, cronies, friends, and followers of political leaders, whose policy influence is 
often very strong. In the 1990s, the influence of interest groups on policymaking was a 
side effect of the major decline of state capacity in post-Soviet countries. However, in the 
2000s, this process became an indispensable part of bad governance: the increasingly 
rent-seeking manner in which Russia was governed discouraged policy reforms and 
reduced them to optional items on the political agenda. 
 
As a result, Russian technocratic reformers found themselves between a rock and a hard 
place. On the one hand, political leaders and public opinion expected policy successes; 
on the other, their policy plans met fierce resistance from interest groups and the state 
apparatus. This situation contributed to privatization of gains and nationalization of 
costs. The costs of policy changes were imposed on society as a whole, while oligarchs 
and/or rent-seeking cronies of political leaders became the main beneficiaries. 
Technocratic reformers, even if they were able to implement their plans, rarely benefited 
from these policies themselves, but were criticized from every corner, and their 
achievements could be revised due to political circumstances. Still, the needs of social 
and economic development in Russia maintained demand for the presence of 
technocratic reformers in state ministries and agencies, and called for more plans for 
policy changes. Yet the scope of this demand declined over time, and policy reforms 
became increasingly unwanted. According to an analysis by the Center for Strategic 
Research, the “Strategy 2010” program of socio-economic policy reforms in Russia, 
developed by technocrats and approved by the Russian government in 2000, was less 
than 40 percent implemented. A similar policy program, “Strategy 2020,” to some extent 
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developed by the same policy teams in the early 2010s, was curtailed and less than 30 
percent of its plans were implemented. In light of this experience, the fate of new policy 
programs seems uncertain to say the least. 
 
Still, the technocratic model of policymaking finds no alternatives in Russia. The key 
asset of post-Soviet technocrats is their (often very successful) professional expertise, 
especially in complex and technically difficult areas such as tax policies or the banking 
sector, where political leaders cannot govern without reliance upon qualified 
professionals. In essence, politicians want to avoid major crises in the governance of 
their respective countries and seek foolproof approaches toward, at least, the economy 
and finance. In addition, the participation of technocrats in informal ruling coalitions 
may increase the sustainability of regimes. It allows political leaders to use divide-and-
rule tactics vis-à-vis their junior partners and reward successful technocrats who 
combine both loyalty and competence. Thus, the promotion of reforms or even the 
maintenance of the status quo by technocrats serves the legitimation of the politico-
economic order and brings benefits to political leaders, and sometimes to the technocrats 
themselves. At the same time, political leaders, who may be genuinely interested in 
policy success, can blame technocrats for undesired costs and unintended consequences 
of reforms, while any positive results of policy changes may open up new opportunities 
for rent-seekers and increase the aggregate profits of the members of the informal ruling 
coalitions.  
 
However, political leaders’ support for technocratic reforms is not a guarantee of policy 
success: Even if this condition is necessary, it is not sufficient. If the personal stances of 
political leaders shift for one reason or another, then policy priorities can even change in 
the opposite direction. For example, the move by Russia’s rulers from economic 
development goals to geopolitical adventures after the annexation of Crimea in 20142 
put Russian technocratic reformers into a peripheral position in terms of priorities, 
which had been changed by Putin almost overnight. The support of political leaders is 
vitally important for technocrats because it gives them leverage for overcoming 
resistance to reforms by powerful interest groups. But sometimes even this support is 
not enough; strong and embedded interest groups can divert policy changes to a 
different direction. This is what happened with police reform in Russia in the early 
2010s: The outcome of the reform was essentially limited to window dressing and the 
reshuffling of some personnel. And even if political leaders reduce interest groups’ 
resistance to policy changes, technocrats are rarely able to impose their control over the 
bureaucrats in charge of policy implementation (especially if these policies require 
effective coordination of various agencies). It is not by chance that while the ministries of 
finance and the central banks of post-Soviet states were able to conduct successful 
macroeconomic policies, target inflation, and implement tax reforms, welfare policies in 
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Russia were conducted in “muddling through” mode. The major difference was that 
governing state finance and reforms in this area depended on decisions made by a 
narrow circle of technocrats, and their formal and informal coordination enabled 
prudent policies. Yet, welfare policies required complex coordination not of several 
persons but of various state agencies on both national and subnational levels. Given the 
poor quality of the bureaucracy and weak incentives for reforms, it was exceedingly 
difficult to achieve sustainable coordination, and even the efforts of the technocrats and 
political leaders were not enough to resolve these issues. 
 
The imperfect technocratic model of policymaking cannot preserve many reforms (even 
under favorable political conditions) from partial and inconsistent implementation, 
emasculation, major revision, or even complete reversal. For technocratic reformers, 
whose professional credibility depends on their reputation in the eyes of political 
leaders, a second chance for correcting errors after certain policy failures and 
relaunching policy reforms may never come. This fact produces incentives to use 
windows of opportunity only to conduct those policy reforms, which can bring 
immediate positive effects in the short term, while policy changes oriented for long-term 
advancements may be postponed. Overall, the choice of short-term priorities for policy 
reform reflect the fact that many post-Soviet leaders have tended to behave, in American 
economist Mancur Olson’s terms, as “roving” rather than “stationary” bandits. Their 
horizons of policy planning have rarely exceeded the next election cycle, while 
transitions to hereditary succession of power are unlikely. 
 
Thus, the imperfect technocratic model of policymaking in Russia (and beyond) faces 
major and irresistible constraints. On the one hand, technocratic reformers and their 
patrons among the political leaders prioritize policy reforms with short-term positive 
effects at the expense of long-term programs. On the other hand, the poor quality of 
bureaucracy and the influence of interest groups distort the goals and means of policy 
changes and negatively affect policy outcomes. Even if technocratic tricks have brought 
certain successes, their price may be prohibitively high in terms of the social bases of 
reforms and their irreversibility. But even if one admits these flaws and defects of the 
technocratic model of policymaking in Russia, to what extent are alternatives to this 
model possible, desirable, and realistic, and what are their effects? 
 
Alternatives to Technocracy: From Bad to Worse? 
 
From the viewpoint of many analysts and the technocrats themselves, the most plausible 
solution is a correction of the defects of the technocratic model, aimed at its 
improvement. The problem, however, is that “for every Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore 
there are many like Mobutu Sese Seko of the Kongo,”3 and not merely because of the 
personal traits of political leaders. Their incentives in Russia have left little chance of 
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healing the inherent defects of the current technocratic model. Quite the opposite, the 
poor quality of the bureaucracy and the dominance of rent-seeking interest groups 
makes attempts to improve the technocratic model very questionable. It may result in 
the expansion of (already rigid) state over-regulation and in the increase of the 
discretion of state watchdogs and law enforcement agencies. These changes may create 
new obstacles to policy reforms. 
 
But what of the odds of a hypothetical transition from the technocratic model of 
policymaking to the political model bringing positive outcomes? In the short-term 
perspective, these odds are more than dubious. The experience of Moldova and Ukraine 
tells us that politically accountable governments, even if they are formed through free 
and fair elections, are often no better at conducting policy reforms than technocratic 
cabinets of ministers. In these cases, the risks of state capture from outside, by oligarchic 
interest groups who compete with each other over rent-seeking, are high, and policy 
reforms may be blocked even if they are a priority for political leaders. A chain of weak, 
inefficient, and corrupt cabinets of ministers is not an attractive alternative to the 
technocratic model.  
 
In the case of present-day Russia, however, improvement of the imperfect technocratic 
model of policymaking appears unrealistic. The sad fate of Ulyukaev, a major proponent 
of post-Soviet technocracy, may serve as a prime example of this tendency. In December 
2017, Ulyukaev, who was Minister of Economic Development during 2013-2016, was 
sentenced to eight years in prison due to accusations of bribery during the process of 
privatizing a large block of shares of the state-owned oil company Rosneft. According to 
many observers, Ulyukaev, who raised his voice against the proposed mechanism of 
privatization of Rosneft, was most probably not guilty of these criminal charges. 
Meanwhile, the Rosneft block of shares was privatized in a very non-transparent and 
suspicious way. Some observers even compared this situation to the infamous loans-for-
shares deals of the 1990s. The outcome of the Rosneft deal was an increase in the 
influence of Putin’s close ally Igor Sechin, who is notorious as a voracious rent-seeker 
even within the grim context of Russian crony capitalism. Ulyukaev, who stood for 
other policy priorities, was sacrificed to the interests of rent-seekers with the consent of 
Putin. In light of the forthcoming Russian presidential elections, this episode 





Ironically, Ulyukaev’s own statement, made more than two decades before his downfall, 
turned out to be prophetic. In the case of the privatization of Rosneft’s block of shares, 
the decision making was quite competent and did indeed “depend upon knowledge and 
experience but not upon voting results.” The competence, knowledge, and experience of 
rent-seekers were much more important than the competence, knowledge and 
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experience of Ulyukaev and the other technocrats. While attempting to avoid the 
negative effects of politics on policymaking and “to achieve a ‘regime of non-
interference’ of politics in other spheres of public life,” technocrats found themselves 
caught in a trap: Policymaking was more affected by the negative influences of rent-
seekers, while politics only aggravated these problems. Even though the technocratic 
recipe brought some short-term gains for early post-Communist policy advancements, it 
has caused increasing problems for policymaking under non-democratic regimes in 
Russia and Eurasia. Despite many efforts by technocratic reformers, the constellation of 
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